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IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE: INCREASING THE 
RISK OF BUSINESS WITH STATE 
SPONSORS OF TERROR 
 Gabriel C. Lajeunesse* †  
Introduction 
If the aims of tort law are deterrence, compensation, and provision of 
equitable distribution of risks, U.S. anti-terrorism laws have been margin-
ally effective at best. Though Congress has passed legislation providing 
causes of action to U.S. victims of terrorism, compensation of victims is 
often difficult and terrorists are rarely deterred. Attempts to provide such 
recourse include the Antiterrorism Act of 1991 (“ATA”), the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), and the Flatow 
Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). These at-
tempts, however, are not enough. 
I. The Challenge of Deterring Terrorist Funding 
Generally, state sponsors of terrorism have not curtailed their activities 
as a result of U.S. legal action. For example, Iran, the most significant state 
sponsor of terrorism, continues unchecked in its campaign of terror for po-
litical ends, despite the significant outstanding judgments against it in U.S. 
courts. Iran provides lethal support in the way of training, finance, logistics, 
and weapons to groups such as the Taliban, Shia militias in Iraq, Lebanese 
Hizballah, and HAMAS; it foments terrorism and violence from the King-
dom of Saudi Arabia to Egypt, from the Sudan, and onward across Africa to 
Morocco. It does all this while charging ahead on a course toward nucleari-
zation that, once achieved, will enable it to ratchet up its terroristic 
adventures abroad unchecked.  
The challenge of suits against state sponsors of terror like Iran is that, 
with the various others sanctions against them, they have very few assets 
remaining in the United States to be attached. Those that they have are ei-
ther frozen or secreted away under layers of business entities whose 
connections to Iran are masked in ways that make it difficult for courts to pro-
vide recourse to their assets. For example, in Flatow v. Alavi Foundation, the 
Fourth Circuit upheld a refusal to attach the assets of an Iranian non-profit 
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based in the United States due to the difficulty of showing Iranian govern-
ment control of the assets and actions of the foundation. 
To achieve deterrence, compensation of victims, and equal distribution 
of risks, there must be a means of attaching assets related to the state spon-
sor’s activities in order to force the sponsor to make a real decision about 
the policies chosen and the potential liability to be incurred.  
II. U.S. Attempts at Deterring Terrorist Financing 
As documented by Robin Wright in her New York Times article, Stuart 
Levey’s War (October 31, 2008), the U.S. government has attempted to make 
a case for greater Iranian accountability within the international community 
and business world for the last several years. The U.S. Department of the 
Treasury has been actively engaged in convincing banks and other financial 
entities essential to Iranian terror operations, such as the insurers of Iran’s 
commercial shipping sector, that doing business with Iran is just too risky. 
Of all the United States’ efforts against Iran, this has been the most effec-
tive, resulting in the 2008 E.U. sanctions against Iran’s Bank Melli—a 
known facilitator of terror financing. However, not all nations have clamped 
down on Iranian business activities, and even those that did initially have 
since returned to an open door policy with Iranian banking and industry: 
Iranian terror banks Bank Melli and Bank Saderat flourish in the Arabian 
financial capital of Dubai; Bank Saderat continues to operate in the United 
Kingdom; Chinese-Iranian trade flourishes; Chinese-Iranian banking rela-
tions continue apace following a brief cessation; and the insurers of Iranian 
shipping appear unconvinced of the risks associated with Iranian business.  
It should be of little surprise that banks and other multi-national corpo-
rations view the risks associated with cutting business ties to Iran as greater 
than those associated with continuing them. Iran is an oil and gas rich nation 
with its own import and trade needs, and very little has happened thus far to 
convince these entities to cease their relations with Iran. With no account-
ability, there is little distribution of liability risk—innocents who travel 
abroad have no recourse against either the murder and mayhem of Iran’s 
terror regime or the financial structures that support it. However, it is possi-
ble to change this risk assessment, and force a change in behavior of both 
state sponsors of terrorism and the financial enterprises that currently do 
business with them. To effectively deter terrorism, recompense victims, and 
balance risk, tort law must include liability for financial enterprises that cur-
rently feel they can do business with a state sponsor of terrorism without 
assuming any risk. Such organizations are, or should be, at risk, because 
their business and services facilitate known terrorist entities in their cam-
paigns of terror.   
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III. Financial Support of Terrorism Under the 
Current Legal Regime 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b), material support to terrorism includes 
providing “any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including cur-
rency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance.” In determining the culpabil-
ity of financial institutions that transfer funds on behalf of terrorist 
organizations, the Eastern District of New York held in Weiss v. National 
Westminster Bank PLC that a bank, in dealing with an entity that was not a 
designated terrorist organization, could still be liable. The court determined 
that the bank had “reason to know of the activities of its clients because of 
its legal and self-imposed obligations to know its customers.” In enacting 
AEDPA, Congress found that “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist 
activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such 
an organization facilitates that conduct.” Stephen I. Landman discusses the 
liability of financial institutions in cases of state-sponsored terror in further 
depth in his thoughtful 2008 article, Bank Liability Under the Anti-
Terrorism Act.  
In a number of recent of cases, victims have sought redress from U.S. 
subsidiaries of financial institutions that provided financial services to ter-
rorists. These cases focus on the provision of financial services to terrorist 
persons and entities; if the institutions knew or should have know that their 
services were being used by terrorists, they should be liable under the statu-
tory definition of material support, interpreted in light of the Congressional 
findings in AEDPA. For example, in Little v. Arab Bank, PLC, victims of 
terrorism are seeking a judgment against the bank for its provision of bank-
ing services to individuals associated with HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ), and other terrorist entities. Similarly, in Zahavi v. Bank of Chi-
na, victims of terrorist acts carried out by the PIJ are looking to hold  the 
Bank of China liable for the Bank’s provision of services.  
In the case of Iran, those providing financial services to Iran’s Bank 
Melli, Bank Saderat, or the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) 
should know that they are dealing with terrorist entities so “tainted by their 
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates 
that conduct.” As such, there can be no “legitimate” business with these or-
ganizations. Bank Saderat and its subsidiaries have been designated as 
terrorist entities under Executive Order 13224. The U.S. Department of the 
Treasury has made public statements that Bank Melli transferred over $100 
million to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp-Qods Force, the Treasury 
designated entity responsible for managing Iran’s terror portfolio abroad. In 
2009, the United Nations determined that a Syria-bound IRISL chartered 
ship was used to violate a Security Council resolution prohibiting arms 
transfers, and the suspected recipients were Lebanese Hizballah and 
HAMAS. Iran’s uses of shipping to facilitate its adventures abroad are not 
new, as documented by former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence 
and Analysis at the Treasury, Matthew Levitt. There can be no doubt that 
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those working with Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, and IRISL should have 
known that the organizations were involved in terrorist activities and, there-
fore, were so tainted that any provision of financial services would facilitate 
terrorist conduct. In addition to these entities, the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) has warned that the significant deficiencies in Iran’s efforts to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing threaten international mar-
kets and has cautioned “financial institutions to give special attention to 
business relationships and transactions with Iran, including Iranian compa-
nies and financial institutions.” This warning was not the first by FATF—
though it was the strongest—and was reiterated by a statement to all finan-
cial institutions operating in the United States by the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network. 
IV. Increasing the Scope of Liability for Terrorist Supporters 
Victim advocates should bring claims against those financial institutions 
(i.e. banks and insurance companies) that continue to do business with Ira-
nian entities engaged in terrorist activities—specifically those doing 
business with Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, or IRISL. It is possible that judges 
may have difficulty attributing liability to these entities, who will surely 
argue that their distance from transactions directly related to terrorism 
shields them from culpability. Congress should be ready to enact clear ena-
bling legislation in unambiguous language that codifies the liability of 
financial institutions for any services provided to  people and organizations 
where their identities as terrorists were known or should have been known.  
Congress should also look at strengthening the legal regime supporting 
U.S. residents that were aliens at the time they were victimized by state 
sponsors of terrorism. These victims are not currently covered under the 
FSIA, and instead must seek redress under the Alien Tort Statute and Torture 
Victim Protection Act. To withstand a motion to dismiss, victims must pre-
sent a heightened pleading prior to discovery that includes (at least 
according to the Eleventh Circuit) “clear statements of [foreign] government 
action and clear identification of the scope and participants in an alleged 
conspiracy.” Unless U.S. or foreign treasury departments are inclined to 
provide extraordinary assistance to victims in developing their cases, it will 
be difficult for victims to obtain such evidence prior to discovery. This dou-
ble standard in the treatment of U.S. persons based upon their nationality at 
the time of the incident further erodes the effectiveness of the deterrent ef-
fect of such claims, and victims are, in effect, left without a forum. As the 
Second Circuit stated in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company: “Most 
likely, the victims cannot sue in the place where the torture occurred. In-
deed, in many instances, merely returning to that place would endanger the 
victim. It is not easy to bring such suits in the courts of another nation. 
Courts are often inhospitable.” Congress should act to make U.S. courts 
more hospitable to those living here, such as refugees, who have suffered at 
the hands of state-sponsored terror abroad.  
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Conclusion 
Until international banks and insurers realize the potential risk of doing 
business with terrorist entities, state sponsors of terror will face no hard pol-
icy choices, and the goals of deterrence, compensation, and equitable 
distribution of risks will not be realized. Legal mechanisms in this country 
must be strengthened to increase the costs of providing assistance to terror-
ism. Only then will the U.S. legal system provide an effective deterrent to 
state sponsored terror. 
